IS EGYPT DAM(MED)?

Previously I introduced the Nile river, its significance and vulnerability, and how the construction of the GERD could threaten this. In this blog, I will expand on the expected negative consequences of the GERD on food production on lower riparians.

Quote from Ismail Serageldin (August 1995)

In 1978, Egypt's president at that time, Anwar Sadat, warned that "The only matter that could take Egypt to war again is water". A decade later, the Egyptian Former UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali further echoed this, warning that "The next war in our region will be over the waters of the Nile, not politics".

As the Nile has forever been a source of lie in an enormously desert state (93%), the threat of going to war over Nile water is firmly ingrained in the Egyptian national subconscious. Throughout their history Egyptians have known that sometimes for water to flow, blood must be spilt. No Egyptian leadership can afford to stand by and let its people suffer from hunger, with over 27 million people experiencing severe water scarcity (Remy and Evan, 2018). With different riparians having different ideas regarding both how they intend to use water resources and their rights and sovereignty over water, achieving a water and food balance in a transboundary river basin is extremely difficult. And the Nile is no exception to this.

GERD & Egypt: Damn, Desertification and Desperation

The dam has become the locus of Egypt’s food anxieties, with the main disagreement being how quickly and when it should be filled, especially if this process ensues during a dry period. Downstream water must be temporarily stopped in order to fill the dam. Egypt is concerned that during filling the dam, it would lose between 11 and 19 billion cubic metres of water, causing 2 million farmers to lose their income and jeopardising food security. The desertification of agricultural land is Egypt's biggest concern, with estimates ranging from 2-4 million hectares of desertification out of the present 8-10 million hectares of arable land. This in conjunction with climate change exacerbating evaporative losses from Sudan and Egypt’s water flow, further reducing the streamflow to Lake Nasser, Aswan, Egypt in the first 5 years (Zhang  et al 2015).

Source: Terra Matter (2020, Jan 17) 'Why Egypt's Lifeline is Drying Up' 

To Fill or Not to Fill?

Ethiopia's reservoir filling strategy is prone to variability and uncertainty, leaving water-dependent sectors including municipal usage, agricultural, and drinking at risk, not to mention the economic consequences of such ambiguity (King & Block 2012). Corn, fava beans, rice, and wheat are among Egypt's main exports, making agriculture a key industry that contributes for around an eighth of the country’s GDP  and employs a quarter of the workforce, allowing Egypt to maintain a healthy foreign exchange position. The Nile's fresh water flow to Egypt may be reduced by one-quarter during this period of filling. Agriculture in the delta, which generates up to 60% of Egypt’s food, may face shortages as well. The Egyptian and Sudanese economies would suffer as a result of the loss of arable land, which will reduce harvest yields, raise food commodity prices, and exacerbate food insecurity.

With over 487.3million people spread across 11 water-stressed countries relying on the Nile to provide a reliable water supply, politics is sure to be inherently tied to its water, criticizing Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s claim. 

To Conclude..

GERD has resulted in a major shift in the hydropolitical hegemony of the basin, with Egypt and Sudan highly dependent on the flows originating in Ethiopia. The concerns regarding the availability of water resources are further exacerbated by an undecided reservoir retention despite the second phase of filling being completed. In blog I’ve to all things bad about GERD which leaves to answer the question…

What is good about GERD?